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Abstract
Traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the
principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and
institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians
and the credibility of policy commitments are limited, this perspective needs to be comple-
mented with an economics of political selection that takes into account the quality of those
elected to political office. We review the emerging literature which investigates institutional
conditions that impact the selection of politicians. We discuss pay in politics, electoral rules,
institutions enhancing transparency in politics, and institutions which govern dual office
holding in different branches of government. We argue that further comparative analyses are
essential in order to gain an improved understanding of the impact that institutions have
on political outcomes, not only via the channel of accountability, but also via the channel of
selection.
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1 Introduction
In order to achieve policy choices that are closer to citizens’ preferences, research in political
economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal-agent relationship be-
tween citizens and politicians and the role of political competition in disciplining political agents.
In particular, (re-)electoral incentives and thus the competition for votes are argued to discipline
politicians either while forming their policy platforms (pre-electoral politics) or while they are
instated in office (post-electoral politics). This mechanism has been extensively studied in mod-
els following the traditions of Downs (1957) and Barro (1973). However, as political control and
the credibility of policy commitments are limited, policy choice is also influenced by the iden-
tity and quality of the individuals who hold political office. Accordingly, two crucial questions
emerge: How does the selection of politicians of different quality influence the political process
and policy choice? And secondly, what determines the selection of heterogeneous politicians in
the first place?
These questions are inspired by a new perspective in political economics, theoretically introduced
in the citizen candidate model. This model, proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley
and Coate (1997), endogenizes who becomes a politician and overcomes the distinction between
citizens and politicians as employed in models of pre-electoral and post-electoral competition. In
his article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Besley (2005) presents a rich set of ideas on
the importance of selection in politics and offers a structure on how to think about the economics
of political selection.
In the meantime, this complementary perspective has provoked considerable scholarly attention
in political economics. One line of research investigates whether the identity and the quality of
the citizens elected to political office have an effect on political outcomes. For example, Jones and
Olken (2005) find that unexpected deaths of national leaders influence economic growth. This
relationship is observed to be prevalent in political systems that lean towards autocracy. Besley
et al. (2011) offer evidence that the education of national leaders positively affects economic
performance. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study the impact of political reservation for
women in India on local public goods provision. They find that political decision-makers invest
more in public goods relevant to the demand of their own genders.
If the composition of the pool of politicians impacts political outcomes, then, indeed, a better
understanding of how politicians are selected is essential. From a political economics perspective,
the central question is whether institutional conditions can be identified that systematically affect
the attractiveness of a political office for candidates of different quality.
In this paper, we provide a survey on recent developments in the economic analysis of political
selection. In particular, we ask whether institutions impact the selection of politicians of dif-
1
ferent quality. In the empirical contributions, the focus is on the (ex-ante) quality dimensions
education, previous income and profession as well as political experience. We take a closer
look at the contributions that study the pay that politicians receive and the role of parties un-
der alternative electoral rules. We then turn our attention to the political selection of people
with different professional backgrounds. This quality dimension is important for determining
the personal socio-economic conditions that influence an individual’s decision to run for office.
Moreover, it shapes the private economic interests that affect the behavior once elected. We
study two salient groups: businessmen and public servants. We again focus on the institutional
conditions impacting the attractiveness of a political mandate for these two groups.
To set the stage, Section 2 emphasizes the complementary devices of sanctioning and selection
for the economic analysis of politics. In Sections 3 and 4, we review the emerging literature
that analyzes major political institutions, such as pay in politics, electoral rules, institutions
enhancing transparency in politics, and institutions governing dual office holding in different
branches of government. Section 5 concludes and identifies a variety of avenues for further
research.
2 Two complementary views: sanctioning and selection
2.1 Political sanctioning
How can political agents be induced to act in the interest of their principals or, put differ-
ently, how can discipline and accountability of decision-makers be accomplished? In order to
address this major concern, political economists have paid most attention to the structuring
of the principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the appropriate design
of political institutions. In particular, elections and the corresponding design of the electoral
system are considered to be the major means for providing the proper incentives to politicians.
Similar to the market for goods and services, an electoral system which aims at enhancing com-
petition among politicians should result in policy choices which are closer to citizens’ preferences.
(Re-)electoral incentives and, thus, the competition for votes discipline the behavior of political
agents either while forming their policy platforms (pre-electoral competition) or while installed
in office (post-electoral competition). The motivation of political agents is traditionally modeled
as being opportunistic including office- and rent-seeking and as being partisan.
In models of pre-electoral competition, first developed by Downs (1957), electoral promises
are considered binding and enforceable.1 The candidates and the parties, respectively, adjust
1Basic models of pre-electoral competition have further restrictive assumptions, such as an
unidimensional policy space, single-peaked preferences and a two-party competition.
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their policy platforms in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. Once elected,
the political agent implements his announced policy. The formation of the policy platform
is central to the choice of policy. Elections function to select policies which are dominated
by the preferences of the median voter. The more competitive elections are, the stronger is the
incentive to adopt a ”middle ground policy platform” to please voters. In models of pre-electoral
competition without partisan considerations, the selection of heterogeneous candidates does not
matter at all.2
In models of post-electoral competition, electoral promises are considered as non-binding. Politi-
cians are elected without a clear and enforceable mandate, and political constitutions are con-
sidered incomplete contracts. Rather than selecting policies, elections serve to select politicians
based on their ideology and their past behavior in office. Disciplining the politicians while in
office is achieved if there are re-electoral incentives and voters who vote retrospectively. Post-
electoral politics are analyzed in political agency models following the tradition of Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986).
In both pre-electoral and post-electoral approaches to the analysis of political competition,
politicians and voters are separate entities and the existence of the former group is exogenously
given. Moreover, in each class of model politicians are assumed to be a homogeneous group.
The selection process and the identity of politicians do not matter.3
On the basis of both analytical frameworks, further institutions are analyzed as to how they
shape the incentives for behavior and structure political competition. This can be briefly illus-
trated when comparing a majoritarian electoral system to a proportional electoral system and a
media system which differs in its political independence. For example, in pre-electoral politics,
a majoritarian electoral system and an independent media system make the commitment and
the positioning of candidates within the policy space easier. In post-electoral politics, major-
ity voting and more transparency in politics through independent media facilitate the control of
politicians and thus also electoral sanctioning since policy choices can be attributed to individual
politicians more easily.
2In models of pre-electoral competition, partisan considerations are introduced with the help
of probabilistic voting. When choosing the policy platforms, the candidates make a trade-off
between their partisan policy preferences and their desire to win the election. In contrast to
the median voter model, in which policy convergence is the result of (strong) electoral competi-
tion, policy divergence can occur in models with partisan loyalties. The partisan motivation is
pioneered by Wittman (1977, 1983) and Alesina (1988).
3Standard models of post-electoral competition focus on moral hazard problems. However,
extensions also include adverse selection. For example, Besley and Case (1995) and Fearon (1999)
model different types of politicians with respect to motivation. For an excellent discussion of
political agency models, see Chapters 3 and 4 in Besley (2006).
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2.2 Political selection
The traditional perspective on competitive elections (within a properly designed electoral sys-
tem) studied as instruments to discipline and sanction politicians has recently been challenged.
The complementary perspective places emphasis on elections as devices for selecting politicians
of different quality.
Firstly, every political process in representative or (semi-)direct democracies inherently involves
the delegation of decision-making power to elected representatives. One might expect decisions
to be taken differently depending on the individual competence and background of the repre-
sentative. Secondly, the degree to which politicians can credibly commit to policy platforms is
limited. The existence of non-binding electoral promises suggests the crucial importance of se-
lecting political agents who will credibly represent and implement a certain policy. Thirdly, the
instruments available for controlling politicians through elections and other institutional provi-
sions are limited. The use or (ab-)use of the discretion gained in political office will therefore
depend on the identity and quality of politicians (see Besley 2005).
The complementary perspective comes along with a new theoretical approach focusing on the
supply of politicians. This is addressed in the citizen candidate model proposed by Osborne and
Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), where self-selection into politics is modeled. In
this approach, the distinction between citizens and political agents is lifted, as politicians are
selected from citizens who decide to enter the political market in the first place. The decision
to enter politics depends on the individual costs and benefits accruing to the political office.
Electoral promises become credible because appropriate candidates are found in the electoral
process for whom policy preferences and personal preferences are aligned. Once elected, the
politician accordingly implements his preferred policy.4
Obviously, the selection of high-quality or ”good” candidates is desirable and becomes a major
concern. Besley (2005) argues that political quality comprises essentially two aspects; i.e., com-
petence and honesty.5 With ease, these two quality dimensions can be further disaggregated.
4Osborne and Slivinski (1996) as well as Besely and Coate (1997) model politics as a three-
stage process. In the first stage, the focus is on what determines a candidate’s entry decision. In
the second stage, citizens decide for whom to vote for. In the last stage, the candidates who have
won implement their most preferred policies. See also Serna (1995) for an excellent and very
early discussion of the supply and demand-side considerations in the market for politicians from
a public choice perspective. A related model of political recruitment taking into account supply
and demand-side considerations is presented by the political scientists Norris and Lovenduski
(1995). For closely related ideas on the function of elections as sanctioning and selection devices,
see Fearon (1999), Patzelt (1999), Brennan and Hamlin (2000) and Mansbridge (2009).
5These qualities are considered ”valence issues”; i.e., voters always demand these qualities in
greater quantities, independent of the actual policy choice. This term is more commonly used
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Political competence involves, for instance, (certain) leadership skills, the ability to understand
politics and reach consensus - skills that are innate or acquired through education, professional
life and previous political engagement. Regarding honesty in politics, one might think of charac-
teristics such as trustworthiness, integrity and loyalty or the related idea that politicians should
possess public service motivation (see Besely 2005).6 Evidently, this concept of political qual-
ity concentrates on ex-ante quality and is far from conclusive, as research is evolving. Earlier
conceptions and especially agency-theoretic frameworks focus on ex-post quality; i.e., behavior
in office. Thereby, being re-elected is often used as a proxy for ex-post quality. A related di-
mension is the congruence of the actual policy choice of politicians with citizens’ preferences.
Conceptually, one might think of a ”good” politician as being one who implements the policy
that would be preferred by the median voter or the policy that would be chosen behind a veil
of uncertainty.7
3 Institutional determinants of political selection
Certainly, the regime type is a crucial factor in the comparative analysis of political selection.
One might expect systematically different incentives to enter politics in a (semi-)direct democ-
racy where politicians are subject to relatively strict citizen’ control in contrast to autocratic
systems, for example. One first piece of evidence is presented by Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2011). They approximate heterogeneity in the competence of politicians by their formal level
of education. In their extensive empirical investigation, better educated politicians are observed
more frequently as leaders in democracies than in autocracies. Moreover, institutions generating
transparency in the political market might affect who decides to become a politician. One can
consider selection effects as resulting from increased public attention being focused on politicians’
behavior due to independent media as well as due to stricter disclosure rules for politicians.8
Further institutional features that vary across jurisdictions and which are likely to be relevant to
an improved understanding of political selection include the remuneration of politicians, parties,
electoral rules, primaries, (gender) quotas, term limits, incompatibility rules, and even immu-
in political science.
6Besley (2006) proposes a model of fiduciary duty as a means of approximating honesty in
politics. Closely related considerations, such as the concept of civic virtue and the role of moral
dispositions in politics are discussed in Brennan and Hamlin (2000).
7See Brennan and Buchanan (1985) for the latter concept.
8As to disclosure in politics, Djankov et al. (2010) present a unique data set on the de jure
and de facto disclosure by politicians covering more than 100 countries. This data set invites
further comparative analyses regarding accountability and selection in politics.
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nity rules.9 Many of these institutions have been analyzed by political economists with regard
to political accountability. However, the complementary view of these institutions in providing
incentives for selection has received much less attention.
3.1 Pay for politicians
In this section, we focus on politicians’ pay as an important determinant of the decision to enter
politics. In addition, we discuss further monetary returns to political office; i.e., outside and
post-office earnings which might affect the attractiveness of entering politics.
Following the traditional perspective in political economics, the effect that a salary has on a
politician’s discipline and performance, respectively, has been analyzed in political agency mod-
els. For example, in a model by Besley (2004) with the possibility of re-election, politicians are
more likely to abstain from rent-seeking activities and behave more in line with citizens’ pref-
erences as the value of office holding increases. He also presents empirical evidence supporting
the positive incentive effect of a higher salary. How changes in salary influence the incentive
to run for political office has only recently been addressed by political economists. Accord-
ing to Besley (2005), the attractiveness of holding a political office stems primarily from three
sources: pay, public service motivation and extractable rents.10 While low-quality politicians
(”bad politicians”) are motivated by pay and extractable rents, high-quality politicians (”good
politicians”) are induced by pay and public service motivation. In order to evaluate how various
factors change the composition of the pool of candidates and politicians, Besley (2005) proposes
an attractiveness ratio defined as (rents + wages)/(public service motivation + wages). The
smaller the attractiveness ratio is, the more high-quality candidates will enter politics. In this
framework, the effect of an increase in pay on the selection of high-quality politicians (”good
politicians”) depends on the relative strength of rents and public service motivation in attract-
ing candidates. If public service motivation is more important than rents for many citizens, an
increase in pay will lead to a lower average quality of politicians. If rents are more relevant than
public service motivation for many citizens, then, an increase in pay will lead to a situation in
which holding a political office becomes more attractive to high-quality candidates.
Caselli and Morelli (2004) present a citizen candidate model and assume there is a positive
relationship between political competence and competence in the private market. In their model,
9See Dal Bo´ et al. (2006) for an excellent theoretical discussion of how threat and violence
can affect self-selection into politics and how the existence of immunity rules positively impacts
the cost-benefit calculus of running for political office.
10Politicians with a public service motivation can be understood as agents who derive more
utility from serving in political office than other politicians. They are intrinsically motivated to
serve the public interest and enjoy carrying out their task (Frey 1997).
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low-quality politicians (”bad politicians”) have a comparative advantage in holding political
office, since they face worse opportunities in the private sector. One central result of this study
is that a higher relative pay in politics increases the average quality of politicians, as candidates
with higher opportunity costs self-select into politics.11 In the same analytical framework,
Messner and Pohlborn (2004) come to a different comparative static result. For intermediate
levels of pay (as long as the political office is relatively unattractive), an increase in pay will
lead to a higher probability that candidates of low quality run which in turn gives high quality
candidates a stronger incentive to free ride on low-quality candidates (with lower opportunity
costs) by not running for political office.
Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) show in a dynamic equilibrium overlapping generations model of
politicians’ careers that an increase in the salary paid to politicians will have a different selection
effect depending on whether the individual is a ”career politician” (politician until retirement)
or an individual with a ”political career” (politician who stays in politics only for a while in order
to signal his quality to the private sector). An increase in pay in the political market renders
this market more attractive to candidates of all quality levels. This lowers the quality of the
worst citizen who becomes a politician (entry effect). Since the political pay has become more
attractive, high-quality incumbent politicians have, however, a stronger incentive to remain in
politics (retention effect). The effect on the average quality of individuals with ”political careers”
is negative. The effect on the average quality of ”career politicians” is ambiguous and depends
on the relative strength of the retention and the entry effect.
Shifting the focus towards empirical contributions, Ferraz and Finan (2009) analyze an exogenous
variation in the pay of local politicians across Brazilian municipalities for elections held in 2000
and 2004. They implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to use the discontinuities
in pay depending on municipality population thresholds to identify the causal effect of pay on
selection. Intuitively, if the pay of politicians is smoothly associated with other characteristics
at the population cut-offs, the effect of pay is estimated by comparing the selection of politicians
in municipalities with population levels just below and above these thresholds.12 As pay is not
11Another very interesting result of Caselli and Morelli (2004) is the following: Low-quality
politicians generate a negative externality for high-quality politicians since the reputation of
individual politicians is affected by the perceived overall quality of the pool of politicians. Due to
this externality, there can be multiple equilibria. For example, in low-quality (”bad”) equilibria
with a large fraction of low-quality politicians, high-quality candidates face weak incentives to
enter politics. A further interesting idea is the one of path dependence in quality. In endogenizing
the rewards from political office, politicians can influence or manipulate (in the case of low-
quality politicians) the rewards of political office for prospective politicians. This leads to the
persistence of equilibria with either low-quality or high-quality politicians.
12For a discussion of the regression discontinuity design (RDD) see Imbens and Lemieux
(2008).
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completely explained by the cut-offs, the fuzzy regression discontinuity design applies a two-stage
least squares estimator using the indicators for the population cut-offs as first-stage instruments
for the increases in pay. Their results indicate that higher pay improves the quality of candidates
and elected politicians as approximated by education (average years of school attendance and the
share with at least a high-school degree) and previous profession (a larger fraction of politicians
with high opportunity costs; i.e., more lawyers and businessmen are attracted). Moreover, higher
pay increases political competition which is indicated by more citizens who run for political office.
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) provide consistent evidence in a similar empirical setting for
Italian mayors for the period 1993 – 2001. They implement a sharp regression discontinuity
design and compare the observations lying closely on either side of the sharp population cut-off
of 5,000. They provide evidence that a higher salary attracts candidates with higher opportunity
costs as approximated by years of schooling and a white collar professional background.13 This
selection effect also carries over to the elected mayors. As regards the size of the effect, they
find that, for example, a 33% higher pay for mayors increases the average years of schooling by
6.2%. Furthermore, the study exploits term limits in order to disentangle the selection and the
incentive effects that pay has on in-office performance as approximated by budget indicators.
Interestingly, most of the improved performance is driven by selection.14
The presented results so far refer to the subnational level, and one might wonder whether they
carry over to higher levels of government. At higher levels of government, monetary incentives
may be of less importance, since becoming a politician is accompanied by more power and higher
prestige.
Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) analyze an increase in politicians’ pay on the national level.
They apply a differences-in-differences approach to an increase of 35% in Finnish parliamentary
pay introduced in 2000 and use candidates in local elections as control group. They find this
increase to be associated with a five percentage points larger fraction of female candidates with
higher education (master’s degree). This effect is, however, not found for male candidates.
Merlo et al. (2010) observe that the average quality of Italian parliamentarians in terms of
formal education has decreased with increasing pay after World War II. However, they abstain
from interpreting this result as causal since it is difficult to separate selection effects of pay
increases from other confounding factors.
A promising investigation for understanding selection and incentive effects is the analysis of an
exceptional remuneration reform for the Members of the European Parliament. Prior to the
13A sharp RDD-design involves a deterministic cut-off at the threshold, around which there
is a discontinuity in the probability of assignment from 0 to 1.
14Ferraz and Finan (2009) also show that higher pay is related to a better performance in
office as approximated by bill sponsorship and the provision of public infrastructure. However,
they cannot disentangle the selection effects from the incentive effects.
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seventh legislative period (starting in 2009), each Member of the European Parliament was paid
just as much as the members of parliament of his home-country parliament, a rule which entailed
large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. From the beginning of
the seventh legislative period, the remuneration is unified, which involves an increase, on average,
of 200% per national delegation. Two independent studies explore the consequences for political
selection. Fisman et al. (2012) find that increasing the salary increases the incumbency rate and
the number of parties fielding a candidate. The ex-ante quality of politicians as approximated
by the selectivity of their university degree decreases as remuneration increases. Braendle (2013)
also finds a similar and positive effect on re-election rates. He finds no effect on the composition
of the pool of politicians in terms of their formal education, previous political experience and
occupational type. However, when restricting the attention to freshmen, he finds that a higher
remuneration is related to a lower fraction of politicians with previous political experience at
the highest national level.
An innovative and closely related idea is presented by Gagliarducci et al. (2010) who examine the
moonlighting activities of politicians. Assuming that the political market and other markets are
not mutually exclusive, high-quality candidates will be more likely to run for office when there is
no restriction in terms of outside earnings. Entering politics is positively associated with gaining
visibility and access to new networks, which renders a political office more attractive for high-
quality candidates. However, a trade-off emerges: The high-quality candidates, once elected, will
be less dedicated to their parliamentary duties, as they prefer pursuing their private economic
interests. Indeed, confronting these predictions with data for Italian parliamentarians between
1996 and 2006, they show that the marginal returns to quality (quality being approximated by
previous market income) are positive. The ratio between outside income and pre-election income
increases when moving up in the pre-election earnings quintiles, and the respective coefficient
is larger than one when regressing outside income on pre-election income. This indicates that
high-quality candidates have a comparative advantage in terms of outside earnings. Regarding
discipline in office, they find that parliamentarians with higher outside income are less committed
to parliamentary activities approximated by voting attendance.15
Besides pay in office and outside earnings, the third major component for the monetary attrac-
tiveness of a political office is post-office returns. Two first contributions try to evaluate these
monetary returns to holding a political office.
Based on career information on members of the U.S. congress between 1953 and 1994, Diermeier
et al. (2005) find that congressional experience significantly increases post-office salaries in the
15Regarding in-office effort Becker et al. (2009) show for members of the German parliament
elected in the majoritarian tier of the electoral system that the more contested the electoral
districts are, the less the politicians engage in outside activities.
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private sector for Members of Congress. However, the marginal effect of an additional term in
office on post-office income diminishes quite rapidly.
Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) innovatively estimate the monetary returns to holding a par-
liamentary seat for recently deceased members of the British House of Commons who served
between 1950 and 1970. They apply both a matching and a regression discontinuity design to
compare elected parliamentarians with candidates who narrowly lost. They find that parliamen-
tary service almost doubled the wealth of members of parliament from the conservative party,
but had no financial benefits for members of parliament adhering to the Labour Party. As an
explanation for the partisan bias, they show that members of parliament from the conservative
party profited from office mainly due to lucrative outside and post-office employments. For par-
liamentarians from the Labour Party, they argue that trade unions were able to exert sufficient
control over the party and its members of parliament to prevent them from selling their services
to other clients.
As regards the comparative institutional analysis of restrictions on outside and post-office earn-
ings, a point that deserves further attention is conflicts of interest. With (high) outside earnings,
politicians face not only a conflict of time, but also a conflict of interest. On the one hand, citizens
appreciate politicians with experience outside politics, and the possibility of outside earnings is
likely to make politics a more attractive market to engage in for high-quality candidates. On
the other hand, politicians who earn more from outside employments and consultancy contracts
(”Beratervertra¨ge”) with large companies or interest groups than from parliamentary allowances
face a conflict of interest and spark strong concerns regarding their independent political stance.
An institutional arrangement which - to a certain degree - balances the countervailing forces
is one which allows for outside earnings but with full disclosure. Conflicts of interest due to
outside earnings are more imminent and severe than those due to post-office returns. However,
the concern, for example, that parliamentarians may become beholden to a government that
has appointed them to a certain post after their election has led to the introduction of incom-
patibility rules which are extended beyond the period of parliamentary service. Research on
further causes of different institutional arrangements on outside and post-office earnings and
the question as to whether these different rules impact political discipline and selection has not
yet been carried out. A good point of departure for the analysis of institutional restrictions on
post-office employment is the related literature on term limits (see e.g., Besley and Case 1995
and Lopez 2003).
Taken together, the theoretical contributions deliver opposing predictions on the relationship
between pay and quality in politics. Based on rich micro data on local politicians, empirical
work shows that a higher pay increases the ex-ante quality of candidates and elected politicians.
Similar studies on the national or supranational level do not confirm these results. Initial research
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on outside- and post-office earnings from political office suggests that these monetary returns
also have to be taken into account when evaluating the attractiveness of a political office.
3.2 Electoral rules and parties
In this section, we turn to the question of whether electoral rules systematically influence the
selection of politicians. We center on the incentives that parties face in selecting candidates
depending on the political competition in alternative electoral systems.
Previous research has investigated the relationship between particular institutional features of
the electoral system such as district magnitude, ballot structure and majoritarian versus pro-
portional representation rules and different measures for political outcomes and policy choices.
The research program by Persson and Tabellini (2005) serves as a benchmark in this line of
research.16 With regard to parties, the political economy literature has focused on examining
single party functions. These functions include, among others, the organization of electoral
campaigns (e.g., Osborne and Tourky 2008), the mobilization of voters (e.g., Herrera and Mar-
tinelli 2006), their informational role as intermediaries (e.g., Caillaud and Tirole 2002 as well
as Snyder and Ting 2002), the formation of policy platforms (e.g., Levy 2004), and the disci-
plining of politicians (e.g., Alesina and Spear 1988).17 The impact of electoral rules and parties
on political selection has only recently been taken up by political economists. Here, the first
contributions by Mattozzi and Merlo (2011) and Galasso and Nannicini (2011a,b) concentrate
on the parties’ demand for politicians. Alternative electoral rules are highly relevant, as they
are assumed to fundamentally change electoral competition and shape parties’ incentives when
selecting candidates.18
Mattozzi and Merlo (2011) propose an equilibrium model of ex-ante selection by two competing
parties. They show that competing parties may not necessarily choose to recruit and nominate
the best candidates. Recruiting candidates of high quality enhances the electoral prospects of
the party. However, party organizations also rely on the willingness of their members to exert
effort in the various stages of the electoral process. In order to maximize the collective effort
16With regard to the choice of redistributive politics under alternative electoral rules, impor-
tant contributions are presented by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) and
Funk and Gathmann (2013). The relationship between electoral rules and corruption is ana-
lyzed; e.g., by Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Persson et al. (2003). Microeconomic
evidence on the behavior of politicians under alternative electoral systems is scarce due to the
paucity of available data sets. An exception is Gagliarducci et al. (2011) which explores the
effect of the two-tier system of the Italian electoral rule on politicians’ behavior.
17For an overview, see Merlo (2010).
18Snyder and Ting (2011) and Serra (2011) investigate how primaries affect candidate quality
and how partisan considerations influence the use of primaries.
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undertaken on behalf of the party (leaders), parties prefer to select mediocre but homogeneous
and committed members as candidates. Thereby, nomination as a candidate is considered the
reward for loyal party services. The selection of high-quality candidates might discourage other
party members from providing political support to the party. In a majoritarian electoral system,
an equilibrium with mediocre-quality politicians (average-quality politicians) is less likely, as the
more candidate-centered and more competitive nature of the electoral process in this system
increases the electoral returns to selecting high-quality candidates.19
Galasso and Nannicini (2011a) take up the issue of parties strategically selecting and allocating
candidates of heterogeneous quality depending on the intensity of political competition. In their
theoretical model, two parties compete in a majoritarian electoral system. Each party first selects
the share of candidates being either experts (high-quality candidates) or loyalists (low-quality
candidates) depending on the degree of political competition. The former group is highly valued
in terms of winning the election, but more costly for the parties.20 In the second stage, parties
allocate the experts (high-quality candidates) to the most contested electoral districts. Based
on data on Italian parliamentarians between 1994 and 2006, the empirical evidence supports the
beneficial effect of political competition on the selection and allocation of politicians. The closer
the electoral races in the districts are, the more parties will rely on high-quality candidates,
measured by years of schooling, previous market income and local government experience.21
Galasso and Nannicini (2011b) extend their earlier framework to study the quality of politicians
under alternative electoral rules. It is argued that differences in the average quality of politicians
between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems critically depend on whether there are
relatively many or few contested electoral districts in the former system. They again use Italy
with its mixed-member electoral system to test this hypothesis. The preliminary findings are
19So far, the selection effects of electoral rules have been studied primarily with respect to the
representation of women in politics. Norris and Franklin (1997) find that the fraction of women
in parliaments is systematically higher under a proportional electoral rule (with closed lists)
and with parties that have instituted formal gender quotas for candidate nomination. See De
Paola et al. (2010) who report a positive selection effect of the introduction of party-list gender
quotas on the representation of women in local politics in Italy. In a related paper, Baltrunaite
et al. (2012) show that gender quotas have a positive effect on the average quality of elected
politicians as approximated by the years of school attendance.
20Serna (1995) argues that one can think of the party calculus of selecting candidates also
in terms of control costs. High-quality candidates are more likely to be successful in winning
elections, but may also generate higher costs in terms of a stronger incentive to deviate from the
party leader’s position. A low-quality candidate (in some models termed loyal) might be more
easily aligned.
21With regard to discipline, the study shows that politicians elected in close races display a
lower absenteeism rate (as a proxy for shirking or rent-seeking). With the help of a regression
discontinuity design, this effect is shown to be driven by selection rather than by incentives.
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consistent with the hypothesis. The average quality of politicians (approximated by the same
measures of ex-ante quality as in Galasso and Nannicini 2011a) in the majoritarian tier is
higher than in the proportional tier if there is a large share of contested electoral districts. Put
differently, the superiority of majoritarian systems with regard to the selection of high-quality
politicians hinges on the degree of electoral competition.
A promising direction for further research on selection by and within parties is the analysis of the
relationship between differences in party nomination procedures and the quality of candidates.
The pioneering work by Lundell (2004) and Hix (2004) might serve as the research basis for such
an investigation. They identify differences in the centralization of party nomination procedures
and (European) electoral rules in a comparative perspective for European countries.
4 Determinants of the occupational composition of the pool of
politicians
In this section, we turn our attention to one important quality dimension of politicians, namely
their professional background. This is important, firstly, for determining the personal socio-
economic conditions that influence an individual’s decision to run for office. Secondly, it shapes
the private economic interests influencing the politicians’ behavior once elected. We select two
prominent groups present in politics: businessmen and public servants. In particular, we ask
which conditions influence the attractiveness of a political mandate for these two groups and
pay attention to the underlying institutional structure.
4.1 Businessmen in politics
In order to promote the personal business interests in politics, businessmen can, for example,
influence politicians by contributing to electoral campaigns or use political connections. With
regard to the latter channel of influence, a fast-growing field of research in finance and corporate
finance analyzes the value of political connections for firm profitability. Politically connected
firms are defined as having a close connection with politics. This is most frequently achieved by
directly employing politicians or high-level public officials. The evidence suggests that political
connections are associated with improved operational and stock market performance (see, e.g.,
Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, 2010, Ferguson and Voth 2008, Goldman et al. 2009, and Luechinger
and Moser 2012), preferential access to credit markets (see, e.g., Faccio et al. 2006, Khwaja
and Mian 2005) as well as favorable regulation (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 2009).
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Political connections are found to be particularly attractive in weak institutional environments.22
All these channels and mechanisms which are used to exert political influence are, however,
indirect. The most direct channel where businessmen run for political office themselves - a phe-
nomenon quite frequently observed - has not yet been subjected to much scholarly attention. On
the one hand, businessmen entering politics are likely to bring in professional experience that
is relevant to political decision-making. Moreover, given their outside activity, their contribu-
tion to legislative decision making is likely to be more independent from narrow party leaders’
interests. On the other hand, consistent with the results presented by research on the value
of political connections, businessmen might exploit their political office and use it primarily to
exert direct political influence and promote their private economic interests.23
Gehlbach et al. (2010) investigate under which institutional conditions businessmen choose to
run for office rather than rely on other means of influence. In their theoretical model, they
demonstrate that the incentives of businessman candidates to run for political office are weak
when democratic institutions are relatively well developed and high levels of political account-
ability prevent rent extraction in the political sphere. In contrast, when democratic institutions
are weak, businessmen can obtain rents in the political sphere. By running for office, they
additionally avoid lobbying costs. Compared to other candidates, businessmen are assumed to
face higher opportunity costs in running for political office, as time and effort must be shifted
from business to campaigning. If the extractable rents from holding a political office are very
high, the opportunity costs of other (professional/career) politicians are lower. Accordingly,
businessman candidates are crowded out of the race. Gehlbach et al. (2010) refer to Russian
gubernatorial elections between 1991 and 2005 to provide empirical evidence. Consistent with
the theoretical prediction, they find that the likelihood of businessman candidacy is decreasing
in media freedom and government transparency (as proxies for strong democratic institutions).
In order to test the crowding out of businessmen by (professional/career) politicians when there
are weak democratic institutions accompanied by a high level of extractable rents, they study
the differential effect of the fraction of employment in natural resource extraction industries (as
a proxy for extractable rents) in conjunction with the development of democratic institutions.
Only for regions with weak democratic institutions, do they find resource abundance to be as-
sociated with a decrease in the probability of businessmen running for political office.
22Most studies provide empirical evidence for East Asian countries with relatively underde-
veloped institutional environments. Consistently, Faccio (2006) and Faccio and Parsley (2009)
report on the basis of cross-country analyses that firm values are more responsive to political
connections in more corrupt countries.
23In a study for 72 countries over 33 years, national leaders’ professions were related to policy
choices. Former entrepreneurs are found to be more likely to implement market-liberalizing
reforms (Dreher et al. 2009).
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Rosenson (2006) relates the representation of businessmen in politics to disclosure rules. She
shows for the U.S. state legislatures that the stricter the rules of financial disclosure are, the
lower is the fraction of businessmen. Interestingly, she also argues that stricter disclosure rules,
which aim at enhancing transparency in politics, might have negative selection effects if high-
quality candidates have a strong preference for privacy and the partisan and journalistic use
of disclosed information makes public life unsatisfying. Van Aaken and Voigt (2011) find no
negative relationship between disclosure rules and the representation of businessmen in politics
at the country level.
The same question, however, with another institutional focus is investigated by Li et al. (2006).
They examine the impact of market, rather than political institutions on the direct (interest)
representation of businessmen in politics. Similar to the literature on politically connected firms,
they argue that entering politics is favorable to businessmen, as it gives them decision-making
power over issues that may concern their own firms. In addition, political engagement offers
businessmen new personal contacts to important government bureaucrats (who are often part
of the same legislative body) which facilitates access to preferential treatment. The weaker the
political and market institutions, the more businessmen (have to) rely on entering politics to
pursue their economic interests. For China, they find that businessmen are more frequently
represented in politics in regions where market and political institutions that support market
function are underdeveloped. The institutional environment is empirically approximated with
the openness of the product and credit market, the intensity of state regulation, the informal
tax burden, and the availability of legal services as a measure of faith in the rule of law.
In sum, the few existing contributions on the selection of businessmen into politics by Gehlbach
et al. (2010), Rosenson (2006) and Li et al. (2006) indicate that the underlying institutional
structure systematically influences the attractiveness of a political office for businessman candi-
dates. It complements the results found in the literature on the value of political connections.
4.2 Public servants in politics
Public servants form the single largest professional group present in most national legislatures.
This disproportionality in representation with respect to professional background sparks con-
cerns regarding descriptive representation since the (work) life experiences of the representatives
differ systematically from those of the represented.24 More importantly, personal unions and
affiliations between the legislature and the public service as well as the perk of guaranteed reem-
ployment compromise the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service
24The concept of descriptive political representation is central in political science. See, for
example, Pitkin (1967) for the basic ideas.
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and, in more general terms, undermine the separation of powers. Their double role as agents in
public service and as principals who supervise the public service in parliament generates a con-
flict of interest. Persons holding both a legislative and an executive position may face decisions
as legislators that affect their role in the executive branch; for instance, when voting on their
own department’s budget. In contrast to all other members of parliament, this conflict of inter-
est should be considered as immanent, as it involves a sovereign area of government activity.25
However, public servants also form a pool of people with first-hand information about public
service issues and a revealed interest in these matters. Thus, electing insiders to parliament who
become accountable to the electorate can serve as a source of expertise and even as a check in
the legislative process. Moreover, due to concerns about the conflicts of interest and the politi-
cization of the public service, in many countries, public servants pursuing a political office are
subject to special legislation. These constitutional provisions either specify the incompatibility
of a public sector position with a legislative mandate or even declare public servants ineligible
for candidacy.
The political scientists Best and Cotta (2000) address the long-term trends in the professional
composition for 11 European countries. With regard to the representation of public servants,
they argue that changes over time might be mainly induced by changing demands for politi-
cal competence. In particular, they claim that public servants are specialists in redistributive
politics. They touch on the role of institutional conditions specific to candidates with a public
sector background, but, nevertheless, abstain from systematically investigating its causes and
consequences.
Braendle and Stutzer (2011) document the phenomenon of the strong representation of public
servants in national parliaments for 71 countries for the years 2000 to 2010.26 They study
constitutional provisions that primarily aim to inhibit conflicts of interest; i.e., the different
regimes that define the (in)compatibility of public service employment with a legislative
mandate. Consistent with the argument that a stricter rule increases the opportunity costs
incurred by public servants when pursuing a political office, they find that stricter rules
25Focusing on the educational branch of the public service, Couch et al. (1992) argue that
the private economic interests of educators who hold dual offices in the educational sector and
in the legislature lead to an inefficient allocation of public funds. For Alabama, they find that
public funding per student at the junior and senior colleges that employ legislators as educators
is significantly higher than that received by comparable institutions. Serna (1995) observes a
positive relationship between the representation of teachers in Swiss cantonal parliaments (the
subnational level) and the pay of cantonal teachers.
26In this group, they include all employees that concurrently hold public law work contracts
and receive public sector pay. Public servants elected to parliament generally come from profes-
sions in education (i.e., teachers or university professors), various fields of public administration,
the judiciary, the police, and the armed forces.
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(ineligibility or strict incompatibility regimes) significantly decrease the fraction of public
servants in parliament by about seven percentage points on average (as compared to less strict
rules on dual office holding).
In a closely related paper, Braendle and Stutzer (2010) look at the determinants of the selection
of public servants into politics in more detail for the German Laender. The political economics
analysis investigates issues of incompatibility and a wide set of related institutions, from a
comparative perspective, that determine the cost-benefit calculus of running for a seat in par-
liament. Based on a newly compiled time-series, cross-sectional data set on the representation
of public servants in German subnational parliaments, they again find the restrictive effects
(with larger sizes of effects) that incompatibility rules have on political selection. Moreover,
institutional privileges granted to public servants when pursuing a political career, in particular
the compensation for holding one’s office in abeyance and special pension benefits, are found to
increase the representation of public servants in parliament.27
5 Concluding remarks
Research on the economics of political selection is a new field in political economy. The con-
tributions are inspiring because they offer a new theoretical approach to the study of politics;
i.e., the citizen-candidate model and the application of modern econometric techniques; e.g., the
regression discontinuity design to recently accessible rich micro-data on politicians. Evidently,
as research is just evolving, there are several unresolved issues. For example, the literature on
political selection emphasizes that the identity and quality of politicians matters or may even
be more important than the incentives set by institutional conditions. This has, however, to
be more extensively studied and should not displace the importance of the insights from the
political economy literature on the role of institutions. Furthermore, the theoretical and em-
pirical work on ex-ante quality in politics is an extremely challenging task.28 In particular, the
important quality dimension honesty has not yet been addressed.
27As regards consequences for the political process, Braendle and Stutzer (2013) propose a
framework which incorporates the quality of legislators in terms of their professional background
into a political economics analysis of parliamentary oversight. When engaging in oversight,
public servants elected to parliament face a conflict of interest but also have lower control costs
due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a
relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. The empirical findings for a time-series, cross-
sectional data set on the German Laender parliaments support the hypothesis of a monitoring
advantage of public servants.
28For a comparison and critique of political competiton in the Downsian framework and the
citizen candidate framework, see Padovano (2012).
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In this article, we argue that a comparative institutional analysis is important as it bridges the
traditional view on institutions as sanctioning devices with recent insights on the importance
of selection in politics. In our eyes, there are two crucial questions that should be addressed:
What are the institutions that systematically impact political selection; i.e., the composition of
the pool of politicians with regard to quality? And, are there consequences for political selec-
tion and ultimately for political outcomes stemming from institutions that are primarily set up
to hold politicians accountable? We focus here on the first question and point to a range of
institutions that are relevant to the study of political selection. In a first step, we discussed the
selection effects of politicians’ pay and of parties under alternative electoral rules. First empirical
studies on the subnational level show that the ex-ante quality of politicians, as approximated
by educational attainment and previous income or profession, increases in the salary paid to
politicians (see Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013, and Ferraz and Finan 2009). Their results,
though, are not found at higher levels of government (Kotakorpi and Poutvaara 2010, Fisman
et al. 2012, and Braendle 2013). As regards electoral rules, we presented the contributions
by Galasso and Nannicini (2011a,b) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2011). They emphasize that the
incentives faced by parties when selecting candidates depend on the nature of competition in
alternative electoral systems. In the next step, we concentrated on the professional background
of politicians. We selected two prominent and well represented groups in politics, namely busi-
nessmen and public servants. The few existing contributions by Gehlbach et al. (2010) and
Rosenson (2006) show that institutions introduced to enhance transparency in politics, such as
freedom of the media system and disclosure rules, are related to smaller numbers of business-
men in politics. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that particularly businessmen enter
politics to promote their private economic interests when the institutional environment is weak.
Braendle and Stutzer (2010, 2011) study the institutions which govern dual office holding in
different branches of government. The major finding is that rules of incompatibility, primarily
introduced to inhibit conflicts of interest, are found to significantly decrease the selection of
public servants into politics. Another prominent and strongly represented profession in politics
is the group of lawyers. Considerations regarding the consequences of their direct representation
reach from concerns of legislation being biased towards the professional interests of lawyers to
the benefit of lawyers (with their particular educational training and professional experience)
assuming a fiduciary function as politicians.29 Here again, the question of what determines their
representation in politics is open. A first analysis is presented by Rosenson (2006). For U.S.
29The earliest contribution by economists which takes up the issue of lawyers in politics is
McCormick and Tollison (1978). In U.S. political science, the issue of lawyers in politics is
addressed by Schlesinger (1957), Hain and Pierson (1975), Podmore (1977), and Miller (1995).
Recently, Matter and Stutzer (2013) study lawyer-legislators’ voting behavior to test the pursuit
of their business interest in tort law. They find that attorneys in the U.S. state legislatures and
in the House of Representatives systematically favor an extended tort law.
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state legislatures, she finds that restrictions on the representation of clients before state entities
(one facet of ethics laws) are negatively related to the representation of lawyers in politics.
The theoretical and empirical analyses presented mainly try to isolate and identify the effect
that single institutions have on political selection. It is clear that future research has to broaden
the perspective and should entail a more detailed analysis of potential interactions between
different institutional features. Future research might consider the differential selection effects
of strict disclosure rules with a (more or less) independent media system or a (more or less)
candidate-centered electoral rule. Another unexplored issue is the interaction between the orga-
nizational structure of a parliament regarding time requirements and the institutional provisions
on moonlighting, disclosure and incompatibility rules.
Throughout this article, we have underlined a complementary view of political institutions.
This approach aims to provide an improved understanding of the mechanisms inducing policy
outcomes - whether these outcomes - are more the result of political selection or of holding politi-
cians accountable, or whether both mechanisms systematically interact. Concerning the design
of political institutions, we suggest that choices concerning the constitutional stage should be
assessed not only with regard to how they solve conflicts of interest and contribute to individ-
ual accountability, but with regard to how they affect the selection into politics. An obvious
example is the decision about the constitutional design of incompatibility rules governing dual
office holding in different branches of government. Such rules are introduced in various forms to
prevent conflicts of interest and thus to reduce agency problems; however, they also systemati-
cally alter the incentives to enter politics in the first place and thus change the pool of available
politicians.
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